Happy Individuals, Weeping Land

 

Huaxi Village, from Wang Zhiming’s blog

In this village, people live in multi-storey villas with two-car garages and nicely trimmed gardens. The K-12 education is free to all residents. Men over 55 years old and women over 50 receive pensions every month from the local government. The healthcare system is so developed that residents’ medical costs are 100 percent covered.

 

Not in Norway or in Sweden, the village is in China. Take a two-hour drive from Shanghai into southeastern Jiangsu Province, and search for a small town called Huaxi Village, you will find it, whose well-known name is “the richest village in China”.

Surprise? Believe it or not, wealthy villagers in Huaxi Village are not alone in China. They are in Shaanxi Province, in Shanxi Province, in Sichuan Province, in Yunnan Province, you list.

That’s a pretty happy story, isn’t it? But the story hasn’t finished yet. If you look closely to these people, you will find out that no matter where they are, they often have a same characteristic: their wealth has nothing to do with agriculture. Some open clothing factories, others exploit coal mine. In Huaxi’s case, villagers operate 12 main factories covering textile, clothing, steel and non-ferrous metal industries, with a total turnover of 40 billion Yuan (6 billion USD) in 2006.

In other word, the only way for Chinese villagers to get rich is not to be peasants any more. The sooner they escape from agriculture, the richer they could possibly get. What an irony.

Pressured by the central government’s “GDP-lism”, those local governments are eager to maximize their economic income from the land to compete with their counterparts in the government performance measurement. Driven by the greediness for money, individual peasants, businessmen and official authorities have the same motive of turning the arable land into something else more profitable. As a result, the worst-case scenario for agriculture is happening in China: the expropriation of farmland has increased 15-fold over the past decade. Until the end of 2008, the total amount of arable land in China is 1.82574 billion acre, accounting for 12.68 percent of China’s total land area, a per-capita average of less than 1.4 acres.

It is so close to 1.8 billion acre, officially called the “bottom red line” for China’s agriculture, a goal set by Chinese central government in 2006 and highlighted in the Outline of China’s the Eleventh Five-year Plan, which is almost the most important and practical governing guideline of Beijing government.

Beijing government may not be the one to blame for the problem. Having been trying to solve the problem, the Central Committee repealed agriculture tax in 2006. The Ministry of Land and Resources also supervised the local governments not to seize the cultivable land in many ways. But after years’ endeavor, the Ministry of Land and Resources still discovered 8514 cases of illegally using land in 2009, 33. 7 percent of which was happened in cultivable land.

The problem is not coming from the policy. The problem is coming from the pocket of every individual: the peasant who is desperate to get out of the poverty, the businessman who greedily stares at the underground coal mine, and the official authority who want to build more factories, develop more industries, and in turn, have a great governing reputation of high economic growth, of course, and get more tax.

Can you change any of these people’s minds? Do you dare to draw any money out of their pocket?

I am afraid no one can.

That comes to the end of the story: a bunch of happy individuals, and a weeping land.

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Housing Crisis and Corrupt Government

 

 

Source: http://news.pub.house365.com/whestate/system/2009/11/09/010035817.shtml

From news.pub.house365.com

 

ChinaGeeks translated an article from China Youth Daily:

Housing is meant to be a one of the basic necessities of life, but at present it has become a very common problem. If the people want to realize their dream of having housing, they must count on the government to move. If government employees could feel the pain caused by these housing problems, that would give them the impetus to do something. But housing welfare for government employees is widespread, and it allows them to distance themselves from the housing market. Whether housing prices are high or low has little effect on their housing, so we must take useful steps to get them to do something. We can’t rely on their senses of responsibility or their consciences.

If the law has banned it, but civic organs are doing it openly, then that is public corruption! This kind of corruption not only destroys the government’s incentive to regulate the housing market, it gives government employees a vested interest in the continued rising of housing prices. Because government employees can get houses easily, the value and profit potential of their property increases as the amount of property they have goes up.

The existence of corruption impedes national efforts to safeguard the housing [market]2. Commercial prices are so high they’re untouchable, so a lot of people have placed their hopes in [the government] safeguarding the housing [market]. And while it’s popular right now to talk about protecting the housing market, this hasn’t really helped the common people much either, and the reason is again corruption. As commercial prices rise, the profit potential for those in power through rent-seeking rises. There has been a mass of construction in the past few years, which should bring housing prices down, but for the corrupt officials who’ve been bought by businessmen and control interests in the housing market, what reason is there to bother with “safeguarding housing”3. Money is owed on “safeguarded housing” all over, and in addition to the connections with the GDP and land finance, corrupt officials are also partly to blame.

It is an interesting angle to look at the housing crisis in China. The author assumes that the solution of the rising housing price is government official’s responsibility and conscience. And because “government employees can get houses easily”, they couldn’t “feel the pain caused by these housing problems”, so they don’t have the “impetus to do something”.

The corrupted government officials should be blamed, obviously, since the corruption behaviors shouldn’t happen anyway. The close relationship between developers and government officials is widely known in China. Sheltered under the local government’s umbrella, developers could pay no attention to the laws and rules, and manipulate the housing market.

But the corruption couldn’t be solved by arresting one or two authorities, it can only be prevented by improving China’s legal supervision system, which means, the centralization of power should be changed. If the legal supervision system is functionally running, if government is under the surveillance from independent organizations and institutes, the corruption will have no place to hide.

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